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DEFEATING THE TERMINATOR: HOW 
REMASTERED ALBUMS MAY HELP RECORD 
COMPANIES AVOID COPYRIGHT 
TERMINATION 
Abstract: Starting in 2013, copyright owners can begin terminating copy-
right grants made thirty-five years earlier. In the music industry, this ter-
mination right could harm the profits of record companies, which rely on 
valuable older recordings to drive profits. But all is not lost for these re-
cord companies, as termination is not guaranteed. Congress excluded 
certain types of work from termination, including derivative works. After 
outlining the standards courts use to determine what constitutes a deriva-
tive work and how remastered albums are made, this Note analyzes 
whether remastered albums will be considered derivative works and thus 
not subject to termination. The Note concludes that, generally, remas-
tered albums should be considered derivative works. Finally, the Note ar-
gues that allowing record companies to continue to utilize these remas-
tered recordings furthers the legislative purposes of both the termination 
provision and the derivative works exception. 
Introduction 
 Record companies have something new to fear beginning in 2013: 
the terminator.1 In passing the Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”),2 
Congress inserted a termination right for authors, allowing them to 
terminate grants of their copyrights to third parties and retake owner-
ship thirty-five years after the grant began.3 This provision affects all 
post-1978 copyrights, meaning the first terminable works will be eligible 
for termination in 2013.4 
 In the music industry, termination could substantially reduce the 
profits of record companies, which rely on sales of recordings from 
older, established artists.5 Once one of these established artists termi-
                                                                                                                      
1 See infra notes 2–10 and accompanying text. 
2 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 
(2006)). 
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). 
4 See id. § 203(a). 
5 See Eriq Gardner, Copyright Battle Comes Home, Law Tech. News, Oct. 8, 2009, http:// 
www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202434372952&Copyright_ 
Battle_Comes_Home. 
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nates the copyright of their sound recordings, the record company will 
no longer be allowed to sell those potentially valuable recordings.6 Los-
ing the right to sell these older recordings could cut deeply into these 
companies’ profits, as market research shows that in 2008, close to half 
of U.S. teenagers did not buy a single compact disc (CD).7 Consumers 
aged thirty-six to fifty, who tend to prefer older artists, drove what CD 
sales existed.8 In addition, record companies earn a higher profit per 
record from sales of older recordings, because such sales require few 
additional costs.9 Thus, one practitioner stated that termination “is a 
life-threatening change for [record companies], the legal equivalent of 
Internet technology.”10 
 Termination is not guaranteed, however.11 Although authors can 
generally terminate grants of their copyrights after thirty-five years, 
Congress excluded certain works from the termination provision, in-
cluding works made for hire and derivative works.12 Works made for 
hire are works either (1) prepared by an employee within the scope of 
his or her employment, or (2) a specially commissioned work in one of 
nine statutory categories.13 A derivative work, meanwhile, is a work 
based upon one or more preexisting works in which the work is recast, 
transformed, or adapted.14 
                                                                                                                      
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b). 
7 See Gardner, supra note 5. 
8 Id. 
9 Randy S. Frisch & Matthew J. Fortnow, Termination of Copyrights in Sound Recordings: Is 
There a Leak in the Record Company Vaults?, 17 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 211, 215 (1993). 
10 Larry Rohter, Record Industry Braces for Artists’ Battles over Song Rights, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 16, 2011, at C1. 
11 See infra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006) (providing that there is no termination right in works 
made for hire); id. § 203(b)(1)(providing that a derivative work prepared prior to termi-
nation does not revert back to the original author but instead can be exploited by its crea-
tor). The term “author” has specific meaning in copyright law. See Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (“As a general rule, the author is the party who 
actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible 
expression entitled to copyright protection.” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994))). 
13 17 U.S.C. § 101. The nine categories are: 
[A] work specially ordered or commissioned for use as [1] a contribution to a 
collective work, [2] as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
[3] as a translation, [4} as a supplementary work, [5] as a compilation, [6] as 
an instructional text, [7] as a test, [8] as answer material for a test, or [9] as 
an atlas. 
Id. 
14 Id. 
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 Other than hoping that recording artists do not terminate their 
copyrights, these exceptions are the record companies’ best chance of 
retaining some way to exploit post-1978 sound recordings after thirty-
five years.15 As a result, many in the industry expect litigation in this 
area to be extensive.16 As one practitioner stated, “We’re going to see 
huge fights over this issue . . . . Litigation is going to get bloody, and 
record labels are legitimately very nervous over copyright termina-
tion.”17 
 Scholars who have explored this question have primarily examined 
whether albums will be considered works made for hire and thus ex-
empt from termination.18 If exempt from termination, record compa-
nies would be able to continue to sell the works without the artist re-
gaining control.19 Although a clear answer has not surfaced, most 
scholars feel that, at best, the issue can only be answered on a case-by-
case basis.20 Therefore, recording companies will likely also attempt to 
utilize the derivative works exception to save their valuable re-
cordings.21 In doing so, those companies might argue that remastered 
versions of the sound recordings are derivative works—especially in 
light of the “loudness wars.”22 The “loudness wars” is a moniker given 
to the trend of music companies mastering sound recordings at the 
highest possible average volume to garner listeners’ attention.23 
                                                                                                                      
15 See generally Firsch & Fortnow, supra note 9 (exploring potential defenses for record 
companies against termination rights); Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in 
Sound Recordings, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 375 (2002) (same); Daniel Gould, Note, Time’s Up: 
Copyright Termination, Work-for-Hire and the Recording Industry, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 91 
(2007) (same). 
16 See Gardner, supra note 5; Rohter, supra note 10. 
17 Gardner, supra note 5. 
18 See generally Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9 (focusing primarily on whether a sound 
recording is a work made for hire); Mark H. Jaffe, Defusing the Time Bomb Once Again—
Determining Authorship in a Sound Recording, 53 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 139 (2006) (fo-
cusing exclusively on authorship and work-made-for-hire status); LaFrance, supra note 15 
(focusing primarily on authorship and whether a sound recording is a work made for 
hire); David Nimmer & Peter S. Menell, Sound Recordings, Works for Hire, and the Termina-
tion-of-Transfers Time Bomb, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 387 (2002) (focusing exclusively 
on authorship and work-made-for-hire status); Gould, supra note 15 (focusing primarily on 
whether a sound recording is a work made for hire). 
19 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006). 
20 See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 224; Jaffe, supra note 18, at 169; Nimmer & 
Menell, supra note 18, at 387. 
21 See infra notes 103–120 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 147–171 and accompanying text. 
23 See Suhas Sreedhar, The Future of Music, Part One: Tearing Down the Wall of Noise, IEEE 
Spectrum (Aug. 2007), http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/the-future-of-music. 
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 This Note analyzes the termination provision of the 1976 Act and 
the derivative works exception, and argues that remastered versions of 
sound recordings should be considered derivative works.24 If such re-
cordings are derivative works, record companies can continue to sell 
them despite an artist’s termination of the original copyright grant, 
creating a strange marketplace where two extremely similar versions of 
the same recording are available from different economic actors.25 If 
they are not derivative works, however, record companies risk the pos-
sibility of the author terminating the original copyright grant and 
thereby preventing the record company from continuing to sell any 
versions of the recording.26 Part I provides an introduction to copyright 
law governing sound recordings, termination, and derivative works and 
explores the process of remastering sound recordings.27 Part II exam-
ines previous case law in analogous situations, such as derivate musical 
compositions, sped-up video games, and edited motion pictures.28 Fi-
nally, Part III argues that remastered works generally will be considered 
derivative works under current law, and that such a finding will further 
the legislative purposes of both the termination provision and the de-
rivative works exception.29 
I. Overview of Copyright Law Covering Sound Recordings 
 Comprehending the relevance of copyright law to remastered 
sound recordings requires a nuanced understanding of the structure of 
copyright law in addition to a technical understanding of how remas-
tered sound recordings are produced.30 Section A offers a brief histori-
cal background of copyright law’s protection of sound recordings.31 
Section B examines the history of, and rationale behind, the termina-
tion right.32 Section C inspects the work-made-for-hire exception to 
termination.33 Section D explores the derivative works exception to 
                                                                                                                      
24 See infra notes 30–366 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 321–350 and accompanying text. 
26 See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 30–174 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 175–263 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 264–366 and accompanying text. 
30 Cf. Gould, supra note 15, at 131 (stating that it is an open question how much a new 
sound recording would have to differ from an old sound recording in the context of ter-
mination); infra notes 36–174 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 50–77 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 78–102 and accompanying text. 
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termination rights and its potential relevance to the music industry.34 
Finally, Section E examines how sound recordings are mastered and 
remastered to help shed light on whether they could be considered de-
rivative works, with a focus on the loudness wars.35 
A. Protection of Sound Recordings: A Brief History 
 The U.S. Constitution expressly gives Congress the power to pro-
tect creative works by securing a limited monopoly in the work to its 
author.36 Although both the Constitution and the first copyright law 
limited copyright protection to writings, the U.S. Supreme Court soon 
recognized that copyright protection could be construed broadly to 
include more than just a “writing” in a strict sense.37 Following the Su-
preme Court’s lead, Congress passed the 1909 Copyright Act (“1909 
Act”), which added express protection for musical compositions.38 This 
right, however, protected only the underlying musical composition.39 
The recording of the song was not covered.40 Instead, artists had to rely 
on state law for protection of sound recordings.41 
 Sound recordings were eventually granted federal copyright protec-
tion, but the protection was limited.42 In 1971, facing growing concerns 
about piracy and the revenue lost by the recording industry as a result, 
Congress passed the Sound Recordings Act of 1971 (“1971 Act”).43 The 
1971 Act amended the list of works expressly granted copyright protec-
tion, adding sound recordings.44 But the protection granted to sound 
recordings was limited compared to other works—it afforded a claim of 
                                                                                                                      
34 See infra notes 103–120 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 121–174 and accompanying text. 
36 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
37 Id.; see Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802); Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (stating that a writing is “all forms of 
writing, printing, engraving, etching, &c. by which the ideas in the mind of the author are 
given visible expression”). 
38 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 5(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 
1976). 
39 See id.; Alfred C. Yen & Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law: Essential Cases and Ma-
terials 313 (2d ed. 2011). 
40 See Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e), 35 Stat. at 1075–76; Yen & Liu, supra note 39, at 
305. 
41 Yen & Liu, supra note 39, at 313 (“Before 1972, state law provided the only protec-
tion for sound recordings”). 
42 See id. 
43 Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). 
44 Sound Recordings Act of 1971 § 1(a), 85 Stat. at 391; see Jaffe, supra note 18, at 144. 
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infringement against only illegal distribution of physical reproductions of 
the works.45 
 This limited protection for sound recordings was carried into in 
the 1976 Act, the successor to the 1909 Act.46 The 1976 Act was over 
twenty years in the making.47 It replaced the 1909 Act and expressly 
changed particular areas of copyright law.48 These changes went into 
effect on January 1, 1978, meaning that all sound recordings created 
on or after that date are governed by the 1976 Act, whereas works cre-
ated before 1978 are governed by the 1909 Act.49 
B. Termination Rights 
 Among the changes included in the 1976 Act was the addition of a 
termination right for authors.50 The termination right allows authors to 
regain sole possession of their copyrights thirty-five years after granting 
them to a third party.51 This right cannot be contracted away, but is sub-
ject to two key exceptions.52 Works made for hire cannot be termi-
nated.53 Additionally, those that create derivative works during the time 
of the grant can continue to exploit those works post-termination.54 
 Section 203 of the U.S. Code grants authors the right to terminate 
any “exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copy-
right or of any right under a copyright” executed on or after January 1, 
1978.55 This right comes to fruition thirty-five years after the initial 
transfer of the copyright.56 Thus, the first works covered by this termi-
nation right could begin to terminate on January 1, 2013.57 In order to 
                                                                                                                      
45 Sound Recordings Act § 1(a), 85 Stat. at 391. Notably, there was no claim of in-
fringement if a sound recording was independently created by another—thus “covers” of 
an artist’s sound recording did not infringe on the artist’s sound recording copyright. See 
id. Also lacking was a right of public performance. See id. (limiting the rights to a sound 
recording to reproduction and distribution to the public). 
46 See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2006). 
47 See Howard B. Abrams, Who’s Sorry Now? Termination Rights and the Derivative Works 
Exception, 62 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 181, 206 (1985) (noting that, in 1955, Congress first ap-
propriated the money necessary to study possible reform of the United States Copyright 
Act). 
48 See Jaffe, supra note 18, at 147. 
49 See 17 U.S.C. § 101, note prec. 
50 Id. § 203. 
51 See id. § 203(a)(3). 
52 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) (2006). 
53 Id. § 203(a). 
54 Id. § 203(b)(1). 
55 Id. § 203(a). 
56 Id. § 203(a)(3). 
57 See id. 
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terminate, an author must give advance notice to the grantee or the 
grantee’s successor in title to the copyrighted work, stating the effective 
date of termination.58 This advance notice must be served no less than 
two nor more than ten years prior to that date.59 
 Importantly, the U.S. Code explicitly states that the termination 
right can be “effected notwithstanding any agreement to the con-
trary.”60 Thus, an author cannot assign away his or her right to termi-
nate, and any contractual provision attempting to do so would be void.61 
                                                                                                                     
 This was a marked change from previous copyright law.62 Before 
the 1976 Act, copyright protection lasted twenty-eight years, at which 
time an author had a right to renew his copyright.63 The second term 
of copyright protection after renewal, known as the renewal term, au-
tomatically reverted to the original author even if he or she had trans-
ferred the rights in the copyright.64 Because federal law did not recog-
nize copyright in a sound recording until February 15, 1972, this 
renewal term is not particularly relevant for sound recordings.65 
 The renewal system is important, however, because its failure was a 
major impetus behind the termination right inserted into the 1976 
Act.66 The purpose of the renewal term was to protect the author and 
his family from an unfavorable grant of his copyright by allowing the 
author to negotiate new contracts for the further exploitation of his 
 
58 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4) (2006). 
59 Id. § 203(a)(4)(A). Thus, an author wishing to terminate a copyright grant on Janu-
ary 1, 2013, must have given notice to the owner of the copyright no later than January 1, 
2011. See id. 
60 Id. § 203(a)(5). 
61 Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 213. Two scholars have noted that 
even if an author had contractually waived his right to terminate in his origi-
nal grant, the author may still terminate thirty-five years later. For example, 
although standard record contracts often provide for artists to assign all rights 
in the copyrights in the recordings, including termination rights, for the term 
of the copyright, such language may not be binding. 
Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5). 
62 See Yen & Liu, supra note 39, at 213 (stating that there are significant differences be-
tween termination and the renewal term that previously existed). 
63 Id. at 206. 
64 Id. 
65 See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. Congress amended the U.S. Code to 
provide for the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings, effective February 15, 
1972. Sound Recordings Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391, 392. The re-
newal term thus would only apply to sound recordings produced from February 15, 1972 
to December 31, 1977. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006). 
66 Yen & Liu, supra note 39, at 206; Abrams, supra note 47, at 209–11. 
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work once its value became better known.67 This purpose was undercut 
by the Supreme Court, however, which allowed authors to contract away 
their renewal rights.68 Thus, in a 1961 report by the Register of Copy-
rights exploring possible changes to be made to the copyright law (the 
“Register’s Report”), the Register stated that “in practice, this reversionary 
feature . . . has largely failed to accomplish its primary purpose.”69 
 To address this failure, the Register of Copyrights offered two al-
ternative forms of reversion in a preliminary draft of the 1976 Act.70 
The first provided that no transfer would be effective after twenty-five 
years with exceptions for derivative works and works made for hire.71 
The second allowed the author to bring suit to terminate the transfer if 
the profits made by the transferee were “strikingly disproportionate to 
the compensation, consideration, or share received by the author.”72 
These provisions were heavily debated.73 Those opposed to reversion-
ary rights argued that for publishers, who invest time, money, and ef-
fort upfront, it was unfair to deny them a financial reward after an arbi-
trary period of time.74 Proponents of revisionary rights argued that 
authors lacked the bargaining power to obtain a fair price for the works 
they contracted away.75 Eventually, the 1965 Revision Bill settled on a 
termination right that went into effect thirty-five years from the date of 
transfer.76 This termination right remains in place.77 
                                                                                                                      
67 House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Copyright Law Revision, Rep. of 
the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 53 
(Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter Register’s Report]. 
68 See, e.g., Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943) 
(holding that the 1909 Act did not nullify an agreement by an author to assign his renewal 
rights); see also Yen & Liu, supra note 39, at 211 (“After Fred Fisher, publishers routinely 
required authors to assign away their renewal rights at the same time they assigned away 
their initial copyrights. This had the effect of greatly reducing the efficacy of renewal as a 
means of giving authors a ‘second bite at the apple.’”). 
69 Register’s Report, supra note 67, at 53. 
70 See Abrams, supra note 47, at 211, 214 (tracing the history of the 1976 Act and not-
ing that the Register of Copyrights, in writing the draft, was influenced by the comments 
and discussion on the Register’s Report, which initially abolished reversionary rights). 
71 Id. at 214 (citing Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law § 16). 
72 Id. at 214–15 (quoting Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law § 16). 
73 Id. at 215. 
74 Id. at 216. 
75 Id. at 216–17. 
76 Abrams, supra note 47, at 221. 
77 See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006); Abrams, supra note 47, at 209. 
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C. Work-Made-for-Hire Exception to Termination Rights 
 This right to terminate, although it cannot be contractually 
waived, is not absolute.78 Congress made clear that the termination 
right does not apply to a work made for hire.79 In defining a work 
made for hire, the 1976 Act states such a work is either (1) a work pre-
pared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment, or 
(2) a specially ordered work in one of nine statutory categories.80 
 a year.85 
                                                                                                                     
 In light of this exception to the termination right, the recording 
industry lobbied in the late 1990s for an amendment to the Copyright 
Act to make sound recordings eligible for work-made-for-hire status.81 
This amendment would have kept recording artists from exercising 
their termination rights.82 The amendment was included as a “techni-
cal amendment” to the unrelated Satellite Home Viewer Improvement 
Act of 1999.83 The outcry over this amendment, which was not in-
cluded in prior drafts of the bill, was intense.84 As a result, the amend-
ment was repealed in less than
 Because the repeal of the amendment specifically stated that no 
inference could be taken from the enactment and subsequent repeal of 
the amendment, it is unclear if sound recordings will be classified as 
works made for hire.86 To determine if one is an employee for purposes 
of the work-made-for-hire doctrine, courts look to the common law of 
 
78 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (providing that there is no termination right in works made 
for hire); id. § 203(b)(1) (providing that a derivative work prepared prior to termination 
does not revert back to the original author but instead can be exploited by its creator). 
79 Id. § 203(a). 
80 17 U.S.C. § 101; see supra note 13 (listing the nine categories). 
81 See LaFrance, supra note 15, at 375 (stating that the 1999 amendment was precipitated 
by a request from the Recording Industry Association of America); Nimmer & Menell, supra 
note 18, at 390–94 (detailing the amendment and its progress through Congress). 
82 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). If sound recordings were explicitly deemed works made for 
hire, termination rights would no longer apply according to the language of the statute. 
See id. 
83 See Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I § 1011(b)–(d), 113 Stat. 1501, 
app. I at 1501A-543 to -44. The Act amended the statutory licenses applicable to retrans-
mission of television signals. Id. at app. I, 113 Stat. at 1501A-523. 
84 LaFrance, supra note 15, at 376 (“[T]he reaction was swift, loud, and overwhelm-
ingly disapproving.”); Nimmer & Menell, supra note 18, at 392 (“When the lobbyists’ back-
room handiwork became known, a firestorm of criticism ensued.”). 
85 See Nimmer & Menell, supra note 18, at 394–95. The act that included the amend-
ment was passed on November, 29, 1999. Id. at 390. The Copyright Corrections Act of 
2000, which deleted the amendment, was passed on October 27, 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-
379, 114 Stat. 1444. 
86 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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agency.87 If the creator of a work is deemed an employee that created 
the work within the scope of his or her employment, that work is given 
work-made-for-hire status.88 Therefore, if recording artists are deemed 
employees, their sound recordings are works made for hire, and thus 
not subject to termination.89 
 This issue has been thoroughly explored in copyright scholar-
ship.90 The consensus is that artists will not qualify as “employees” of 
the record companies, thus foreclosing the first prong of the work-
made-for-hire inquiry.91 Record companies, therefore, will have to ar-
gue that a sound recording is a specially commissioned work that fits 
within one of the nine statutory categories in order for a work to fall 
within the work-made-for-hire exception.92 
 Of those nine categories, record companies are most likely to argue 
that individual sound recordings are specially commissioned works for a 
collective work: an album.93 A collective work is defined in the 1976 Act 
as “a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in 
which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independ-
ent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.”94 In the 
eyes of some scholars, the termination controversy boils down to wheth-
er an album can be considered a collective work.95 
                                                                                                                      
87 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 740–41. Factors to consider include: 
control over the manner and means by which the product is accomplished 
. . . ; the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the loca-
tion of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; wheth-
er the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired par-
ty; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; 
the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; 
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether 
the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax 
treatment of the hired party. 
Id. at 751–52. 
88 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
89 See id. § 203(a). 
90 See supra note 18 (collecting sources). 
91 See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 18, at 164 (stating that recording artists “cannot reasonably 
be determined to be employees”); LaFrance, supra note 15, at 379 (“Many, if not most, of 
the creative participants in a sound recording, however, are not record label employees. 
The most obvious examples are the featured vocalists and musicians . . . .”). 
92 See Jaffe, supra note 18, at 166; see also supra note 13 (listing the nine categories of el-
igible specially commissioned works); LaFrance, supra note 15, at 379. 
93 See Jaffe, supra note 18, at 167. 
94 17 U.S.C § 101 (2006). 
95 David Nimmer et al., Pre-existing Confusion in Copyright’s Work-for-Hire Doctrine 2 (Univ. 
of Cal., Berkeley Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 109, 2002), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=359720. 
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 The case law illustrates that courts have not granted this specially 
commissioned status to sound recordings.96 For example, in 1997, in 
Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broadcast Services, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s finding that a jingle writ-
ten for television and radio was a work for hire.97 Furthermore, in 1999, 
in Ballas v. Tedesco, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey 
ruled that the plaintiff’s argument that the sound recordings at issue 
were works for hire was without merit.98 The court looked to the defini-
tion of works for hire in the 1976 Act and concluded that a sound re-
cording did not necessarily fit under that definition.99 
 Similarly, scholars who have looked at the issue have concluded 
that, at best, such a claim can be decided only on a case-by-case basis.100 
Professor David Nimmer, a leading copyright scholar, in conjunction 
with two other scholars, concluded that to meet the standard for a col-
lective work, a record company must make a creative contribution to 
the album separate from the recording artist, perhaps through the se-
lection or arrangement of the songs or artists chosen.101 Thus, al-
though record labels will surely argue in termination disputes that the 
terminated sound recordings qualify for work-made-for-hire status—
allowing the labels to prevent termination entirely—the labels will likely 
consider other strategies to avoid termination.102 
                                                                                                                     
D. Derivative Works Exception to Termination Rights 
 In addition to the work-made-for-hire exception, there is an excep-
tion to the termination right for derivative works.103 Thus, one alterna-
tive strategy for a record company looking to avoid termination would 
be to argue that the record companies have created derivative works by 
either remixing or remastering previously recorded works.104 A deriva-
 
96 Nimmer & Menell, supra note 18, at 402. 
97 128 F.3d 872, 878–79 (5th Cir. 1997). 
98 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999). 
99 See id.; see also Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63–64 (D.D.C. 
1999) (holding that a sound recording is not a specially commissioned work for hire, per se). 
100 See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 224; Jaffe, supra note 18, at 169; Nimmer & 
Menell, supra note 18, at 387. 
101 Nimmer et al., supra note 95, at 3. 
102 See supra notes 93–101 and accompanying text. 
103 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2006). 
104 See id. § 203(b)(1); id. § 101 (defining derivative work as “a work based upon one or 
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionali-
zation, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensa-
tion, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”). 
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tive work consists of a contribution of original material to an already 
existing work which recasts, transforms, or adopts the previous work.105 
A derivative work based on the copyrighted work, created during the 
grant, may continue to be utilized under the original terms of the grant 
by the derivative work’s creator.106 In other words, although the original 
copyrighted work is returned to the author, the creator of the derivative 
work may continue to utilize that derivative work without infringing the 
original copyright.107 
 The rationale for the derivative work exception was to avoid un-
fairness to motion picture producers.108 This rationale stems from a 
comment on the Register’s Report, which argued that it was unfair for 
producers to lose their rights to exploit finished works because they 
usually acquired their rights via an up-front, lump sum payment before 
investing talent and resources into the motion picture.109 According to 
at least one scholar, it was this argument that provided the rationale for 
the derivative works exception, which first appeared in the Register of 
Copyrights’ preliminary draft.110 In addition, these works are protected 
from termination, because otherwise the terminating authors might 
use their termination rights to extract prohibitive fees from owners of 
successful derivative works or to bring infringement actions against 
them.111 By 1965, the drafters of the Revision Bill had agreed to lan-
guage establishing the exception for derivative works, and the excep-
tion appeared in all subsequent bills up to and including the 1976 
Act.112 
 Claiming a remixed or remastered album to be a derivative work 
would provide a lesser remedy than the work-made-for-hire defense, as 
the record company would be permitted to exploit only the derivative 
work—the remixed or remastered recordings—while the rights in orig-
inal recordings would revert to the author.113 Although not optimal for 
                                                                                                                      
105 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 3.03[A] (2010). 
106 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1). 
107 See id. 
108 See Abrams, supra note 47, at 213. 
109 Id.; see House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., Copyright Law Revision 
Part 2, Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of Copyrights on the 
General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 264–65 (Comm. Print 1963). 
110 Abrams, supra note 47, at 213. 
111 See Woods v. Bourne, 60 F.3d 978, 986 (2d Cir. 1995). 
112 See Abrams, supra note 47, at 221. 
113 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2006). 
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the record companies, this result is preferable to losing all rights to the 
valuable recordings of various artists.114 
 To qualify as a derivative work, a work must be independently cop-
yrightable.115 To achieve separate copyright status, a derivative work’s 
recasting, transformation, or adaptation of the original work must con-
stitute more than a trivial contribution.116 The general standard used 
by courts is that a quantum of originality is necessary, one that consti-
tutes a distinguishable variation from the original work in any meaning-
ful manner that is more than merely trivial.117 This seemingly lenient 
standard is a result of the low bar for copyright, as courts will not take it 
upon themselves to be the judge of artistic value.118 
 The strategy of arguing that remastered albums are derivative 
works has been acknowledged by various scholars, but most have treat-
ed it minimally in favor of focusing on whether sound recordings can 
be considered works made for hire.119 Practitioners in the field, how-
ever, expect record companies to assert that remixed or remastered 
albums are indeed derivative works.120 
E. Remastered Works as Derivative Works 
 Determining whether a remastered sound recording can qualify as 
a derivative work requires not just a detailed understanding of the way 
the law has treated derivative sound recordings, but also a thorough 
knowledge of the mastering and remastering process.121 Guidance 
                                                                                                                      
114 See id. § 203(b); supra notes 5–10, 51–54 and accompanying text. 
115 Woods, 60 F.3d at 990 (citing Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1320–21 (2d 
Cir. 1989)). 
116 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 105, § 3.03[A]. 
117 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 105, § 3.03[A]. This standard has been proposed by 
Professor David Nimmer. Id. Courts have consistently cited this standard with approval. See 
Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1290 n.12 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nimmer & Nim-
mer); Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Fla., Inc., 753 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(citing Nimmer & Nimmer); Siegel v. Time Warner Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1152 (C.D. 
Cal. 2007) (quoting Nimmer & Nimmer). 
118 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J., 
dictum) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to con-
stitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrow-
est and most obvious limits.”). 
119 See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 225–26 (devoting fewer than two full pages 
out of a twenty-five page article to the topic); Gould, supra note 15, at 131–33 (devoting 
fewer than three full pages out of a forty-seven page note to the topic). 
120 See, e.g., Eliot Van Buskirk, Copyright Time Bomb Set to Disrupt Music, Publishing Indus-
tries, Wired.com (Nov. 13, 2009, 3:17 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/11/ 
copyright-time-bomb-set-to-disrupt-music-publishing-industries/. 
121 See infra notes 123–171 and accompanying text. 
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from statutory law is sparse.122 Regarding sound recordings, the U.S. 
Code states that a “derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in 
the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in 
sequence or quality” is copyrightable.123 Although it does not have the 
force of law, the Compendium of Copyright Office Practices (“Compen-
dium”)— “the general guide on registration, recordation, and related 
practices consulted by Copyright Office staff and the public” —states 
that remixed versions of preexisting sound recordings are acceptable to 
receive a derivative copyright.124 On the other hand, the Compendium 
indicates that just remastering a previous recording cannot be the sole 
basis of a claim for a derivative copyright.125 
 Because of the lack of statutory guidance, it is helpful to examine 
the remastering process to determine if that process is sufficiently crea-
tive to warrant derivative copyright status.126 Generally, when sound 
recordings are first created, they are mixed and mastered in addition to 
being recorded.127 Remastering a work entails performing this master-
ing process  to the recording again to achieve a different sound.128 The 
“loudness wars,” a trend of music companies to master sound re-
cordings at the highest possible average volume, has had an effect on 
the sound of remastered albums.129 To some, these remastered albums 
sound noticeably worse than the original sound recordings.130 Recog-
nizing the ability of this process to affect a sound recording, one district 
court upheld a derivative copyright to a remixed and remastered sound 
recording, finding that the new recording was an improvement over 
the old recording and was thus sufficiently original under copyright 
                                                                                                                      
122 See infra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. 
123 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2006). 
124 Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices § 496.03(b)(1), http://ipmall. 
info/hosted_resources/CopyrightCompendium/chapter_0400.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) 
[hereinafter Compendium II]; Compendium II: Copyright Office Practices, U.S. Copyright Of-
fice, http://www.copyright.gov/compendium/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2012); cf. Schweiker v. 
Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) (stating that the Social Security Administration’s Claims 
Manual has no legal force and therefore does not bind the Social Security Administration). 
125 Compendium II, supra note 124, § 496.03(b)(2). 
126 See infra notes 127–171 and accompanying text. 
127 See David Miles Huber & Robert E. Runstein, Modern Recording Techniques 
20–21 (7th ed. 2010). 
128 See Steve Guttenberg, What’s the Difference? CD ‘Mastering’ vs. ‘Remastering,’ CNET 
(Feb. 8, 2008, 6:43 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13645_3-9869772-47.html. 
129 See infra notes 162–166 and accompanying text (discussing how the loudness wars ra-
tionale has significantly altered remastered albums, resulting in noticeably different sound 
recordings). 
130 See infra notes 162–171 and accompanying text (summarizing negative reactions to 
some remastered sound recordings). 
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law.131 Whether this ruling will extend to all remastered albums re-
quires one to explore the remastering process.132 
1. Mastering and Remastering Defined 
 Albums are usually handled by both a mixing engineer and a mas-
tering engineer before they are finalized, and both engineers perform 
different functions.133 These functions are often confused with one an-
other and may sometimes blend together, but there are differences be-
tween the two.134 When an album is “mixed,” the individually recorded 
parts of each song, such as the drums, guitars, and vocals, are adjusted 
by an engineer who blends the parts into one sound, adjusting the rela-
tive sounds of each individual track to create the best overall composi-
tion.135 
 After the mixing process, an album is “mastered.”136 Mastering is 
the last creative step in the audio production process, which is the final 
step before replication and distribution.137 In general terms, mastering 
is when the sound of a recording is balanced, equalized, and en-
hanced.138 The mastering engineer listens to the sound recording in a 
specialized environment and changes the levels, equalization, and dy-
namics of the recording so that the final version achieves its best possi-
ble sonic qualities.139 Usually, the mastering process will be performed 
on the song after it has already been mixed for a stereo sound sys-
tem.140 
 Both mixing and mastering engineers were given a new medium 
with the introduction of the CD in the 1980s, which gave recording art-
                                                                                                                      
131 See Maljack Prods., Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1416, 1428 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d 
sub nom. Batjac Prods. Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
132 See infra notes 133–146 and accompanying text. 
133 See Huber & Runstein, supra note 127, at 20–21. 
134 John Scott G, Mastering Your Music: Why You Need It, Where to Get It, and How to Make 
the Most of It, MusicBizAcademy.com, http://www.musicbizacademy.com/articles/gman_ 
mastering.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
135 See Huber & Runstein, supra note 127, at 429. 
136 Bob Katz, Mastering Audio: The Art and the Science 12 (2d ed. 2007). 
137 Id. 
138 What Is Mastering?, DiscMakers, http://www.discmakers.com/soundlab/whatis 
mastering.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
139 Huber & Runstein, supra note 127, at 21. 
140 What Is Mastering?, Valvetone, http://www.valvetone.com/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=57&Itemid=67 (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
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ists more acoustic possibility to record their sound.141 Eventually, re-
cord companies took advantage of this extra sonic potential by remas-
tering previous albums and re-releasing them.142 
                                                                                                                     
 Remastering is, in essence, the process of mastering the original 
sound recordings again.143 The remastering engineer uses the original 
tapes or files, listens to them again, and attempts to achieve a better 
sound on a newly mastered recording.144 The process can be quite time 
intensive, as one remastering engineer stated that it can occasionally 
take forty hours to “remove all the clicks and pops from the original 
source.”145 In contrast to mixing, which can affect individual tracks 
within a single song, the remastering process can affect only the already 
mixed recording.146 
2. The Loudness Wars: A Trend in Modern Remastering 
 Doubting the creativity needed to create a remastered sound re-
cording, some have questioned whether the trend of releasing remas-
tered versions of previous sound recordings is anything more than a 
cash grab by the record companies, pawning off an old work as some-
thing different and new.147 But a specific group of consumers, artists, 
 
 
141 Nick Southall, Imperfect Sound Forever, Stylus Mag. (May 1, 2006), http://stylus 
magazine.com/articles/weekly_article/imperfect-sound-forever.htm. Vinyl records allowed 
only for a dynamic range of seventy-five decibels (dB) in a sound recording; a CD has a 
range of approximately ninety dB. Id. For comparison, live music spans approximately 
120dB. Id. Such a difference meant that music could be recorded on a CD with a larger 
differential between the quiet moments of a song and its loud moments to capture the 
sonic intent of the recording artist more accurately. Id. 
142 Keith Hanlon, The Myth of Remastering, Blogcritics (Sept. 23, 2003), http://blog 
critics.org/music/article/the-myth-of-remastering/. In the 1980s, record companies did 
not utilize the extra sonic potential, as most CDs were just basic transfers of the original 
recording of the music, often with no changes made to realize the potential dynamics of 
the CD. See id. These transfers are referred to by sound engineers as “flat transfers.” See id. 
By the 1990s, however, record companies realized that by reissuing and remastering their 
back catalog, they could make more money. Patrick Flanary, Musicians Split over Album Reis-
sues, Rolling Stone (Aug. 3, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/ 
musicians-split-over-album-reissues-20110803; Hanlon, supra. 
143 Guttenberg, supra note 128. 
144 Id. 
145 Andrew Harris, Music’s New Digital Frontier, Vine (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.the 
vine.com.au/music/news/music%27s-new-digital-frontier20110807.aspx. 
146 Harvey Reid, About Re-Mastering, Woodpecker Records, http://www.woodpecker. 
com/writing/essays/remastering.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
147 See, e.g., Flanary, supra note 142;  Christine Khalil, Remastered Albums—A Brilliant Mar-
keting Ploy or Loss of Authenticity for a New Generation?, AU Rev. (Nov. 4, 2011, 12:54 PM), 
http://www.theaureview.com/features/remastered-albums-a-brilliant-marketing-ploy-or-loss-
of-authenticity-for-a-new-generation; The Art of Re-Mastering, BBC (Apr. 29, 2010), http:// 
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and sound engineers alike claim there is a noticeable change in these 
remastered recordings, often for the worse.148 These discerning listen-
ers claim that music is being mastered and remastered too loud in re-
cent years, ruining the dynamic range in the original recordings and 
sometimes making music unlistenable.149 
 These listeners call their fight the “loudness wars,” their term for 
the relatively recent trend of mastering sound recordings at the highest 
possible average volume.150 To create this “loudness,” sound engineers 
use a technique called dynamic range compression, which reduces the 
difference between the loudest and softest sounds in a song.151 Record 
companies push for this, believing it will make the sound recording 
stand out to the listener.152 As a result, some listeners claim that albums 
remastered according to this rationale sound noticeably different, mak-
ing the remastering process arguably transformative.153 
 Modern sound recordings on CDs are mastered in an extremely 
compressed way because some believe that louder music will stand out 
more to the listener on the radio.154 Most modern CDs are mastered 
                                                                                                                      
 
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00s3h40 (exploring whether digital re-mastering is just an-
other way of selling music to consumers that they already own). 
148 See Robert Levine, The Death of High Fidelity, Rolling Stone, Dec. 27, 2007, at 15, 
18. As one Rolling Stone Magazine contributor notes: 
It’s not just new music that’s too loud. Many remastered recordings suffer the 
same problem as engineers apply compression to bring them into line with 
modern tastes. The new Led Zeppelin collection, Mothership, is louder than 
the band’s original albums, and [David] Bendeth, who mixed Elvis Presley’s 
30 #1 Hits, says that the album was mastered too loud for his taste. 
Id. 
149 See Tim Anderson, How CDs Are Remastering the Art of Noise, Guardian, Jan. 17, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jan/18/pop.music. 
150 See Sreedhar, supra note 23. 
151 Levine, supra note 148, at 15. Compression is not a new technique, as rock and pop 
music producers and engineers consistently used compression to balance out different 
instruments in a recording before the age of CDs. Id. at 18. Vinyl, however, physically lim-
ited how high bass levels could go, as the needle of the record player could skip off the 
groove. Id. CDs, with a larger dynamic range and digital technology, have no such physical 
limitation. See id. 
152 See id. at 16. The idea behind this is rooted in science: because the inner ear auto-
matically compresses high volume to protect itself, humans subconsciously associate com-
pression with loudness. Id. And because humans have evolved to pay particular attention 
to loud noises, compressed sounds initially seem more exciting to the listener. Id. 
153 See infra notes 159–171 and accompanying text. 
154 Levine, supra note 148, at 16; Southall, supra note 141. There is research that suggests 
that such compressed music does not, in fact, stand out more to the listener on the radio. See 
Ian Shephard, Loudness Means Nothing on the Radio—The Proof, Production Advice (Mar. 6, 
2011), http://productionadvice.co.uk/loudness-means-nothing-on-the-radio/; Earl Vickers, 
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within only the top five loudest decibels (dB) of the CD.155 The 1995 
album (What’s the Story) Morning Glory by rock band Oasis is often cited 
as the major impetus behind this ultra-compression.156 On many songs, 
the difference between the loudest and quietest parts was merely eight 
dB, all at the highest range of the loudness spectrum.157 The album was 
incredibly popular, and some believe its loudness was instrumental to 
its success.158 
 Those opposed to loudness, however, claim that music sounds sig-
nificantly different—in fact, worse—when its range is so compressed by 
this process.159 Donald Fagen of the rock band Steely Dan told Rolling 
Stone Magazine, “With all the technical innovation, music sounds worse. 
God is in the details. But there are no details anymore.”160 Sound engi-
neer Steve Hoffman, who specializes in remastering old rock albums, 
said that, “When everything is loud, it doesn’t sound loud anymore. 
The only way that something can sound loud is if there’s something 
quiet that precedes it, or else there’s no frame of reference.”161 
 Following in the steps of these new releases, remastered versions of 
previously released albums soon became victims of the so-called loud-
ness wars, resulting in the remastered versions sounding much differ-
ent than the original recordings.162 For example, the song “Search and 
Destroy” on the 1997 remastered version of Iggy Pop and the Stooges’ 
album Raw Power was remastered within a loudness range of less than 
three dB.163 For comparison, the version on the original 1990 CD re-
                                                                                                                      
 
The Loudness War: Background, Speculation and Recommendations 19 (Nov. 4, 2010), 
http://www.sfxmachine.com/docs/loudnesswar/loudness_war.pdf. 
155 Southall, supra note 141. 
156 Levine supra note 148, at 18; Southall, supra note 141. 
157 Southall, supra note 141. 
158 Id. According to one commentator: 
Audiophiles and people who work in audio engineering largely agree that 
this is too loud, but in the face of massive commercial impetus their say is of-
ten ignored. Arguably (What’s the Story) Morning Glory became so successful in 
the UK precisely because it was so loud; its excessive volume and lack of dy-
namics meant it worked incredibly well in noisy environments like cars and 
crowded pubs, meaning it very easily became an ubiquitous and noticeable 
record in cultural terms. 
Id. 
159 See infra notes 160–161 and accompanying text. 
160 Levine, supra note 148, at 16. 
161 Anderson, supra note 149. 
162 See id.; Southall, supra note 141. 
163 Loudness, Chi. Mastering Service, http://www.chicagomasteringservice.com/ 
loudness.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). The loudness range is measured by root mean 
squared metering, which attempts to average the level of loudness of a recording over a 
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lease had an average loudness range of nearly fourteen dB.164 In 2010, 
record company EMI Music faced outcry over the remastering of Du-
ran Duran’s music, not merely from fans but from the artist.165 After 
the release, guitarist Andy Taylor stated on Twitter, the social network-
ing website, that the album “[s]ounds like it was done down the pub 
. . . . I can express my utter disgust & the remastering’s crap.”166 
 It is not just the artists that are noticing the difference either— 
portions of the music-consuming public believe that remastering al-
bums can result in a noticeably different recording from the original 
work.167 Fans of the rock band Metallica established an online petition 
after the release of the band’s album Death Magnetic to have that album 
remixed or remastered after many were disappointed in the release, 
highlighting the ability of remixing or remastering to alter a sound re-
cording.168 The petition, published on September 10, 2008, has over 
22,000 signatures.169 The outcry intensified when both fans and the 
sound engineer himself proclaimed that the versions of the songs fea-
tured on the video game Guitar Hero, which were not compressed in the 
same way as the songs on the album, sounded better.170 Meanwhile, or-
                                                                                                                      
long period of time to more closely correspond to the human perception of loudness. See 
id. 
164 Id. 
165 Sean Michaels, EMI Defends Duran Duran Remasters, Guardian, July 15, 2010, http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/music/2010/jul/15/emi-defends-remastered-duran-albums. 
166 Id. Despite these criticisms, remastered albums have also been praised for trans-
forming the original by improving the sound. See Levine, supra note 148, at 16; The Thirty 
Best Reissues Ever, NME (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nme.com/photos/the-30-best-reissues-
ever/230625/1/1#4. In the process of releasing a best-of collection of deceased recording 
artist Jeff Buckley, his mother listened to her son’s original recordings and found that they 
sounded different than the 2004 remastered version. Levine, supra note 148, at 16. As 
such, she recruited an independent company to once again remaster the recordings from 
the original source, and claimed that in the newly-remastered version, “You can hear the 
distinct instruments and the sound of the room . . . . Compression smudges things to-
gether.” Id. Additionally, NME Magazine, in compiling a list of the best thirty reissues ever, 
cited a remastered version of artist Sly & the Family Stone’s There’s a Riot Going On, listing it 
because the remastered work was a sonic improvement over the original CD. The Thirty Best 
Reissues Ever, supra. 
167 See supra notes 159–166 and accompanying text (showcasing negative artist reaction 
to remastered sound recordings); infra notes 168–171 and accompanying text (highlight-
ing music consumers’ beliefs that remastering sound recordings can make the sound re-
cording either better or worse). 
168 See Petition to Re-Mix or Remaster Death Magnetic!, GoPetition.com (Sept. 10, 2008), 
http://www.gopetition.com/petitions/re-mix-or-remaster-death-magnetic.html. 
169 Id. 
170 Daniel Kreps, Fans Complain After “Death Magnetic” Sounds Better on “Guitar Hero” 
Than CD, Rolling Stone (Sept. 18, 2008, 2:12 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/ 
news/fans-complain-after-death-magnetic-sounds-better-on-guitar-hero-than-cd-20080918. 
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ganizations such as Justice for Audio and Turn Me Up have been 
formed to attempt to combat the loudness wars by increasing public 
awareness and working with artists and recording professionals.171 
 Remastered works that were a part of the loudness wars thus raise 
an interesting question in relation to termination: whether or not this 
remastering process, which reactions show can noticeably alter a sound 
recording, is creative enough to warrant derivative work status.172 What 
qualifies as a derivative work is left to a difficult-to-predict assessment of 
what is, and what is not, sufficiently creative.173 A thorough analysis is 
thus needed to determine whether, generally, these remastered re-
cordings may be considered derivative works and thus exempt from 
termination.174 
II. A Little Help?: Courts and Musical Derivative Works 
 It is unclear how courts will decide the issue of a work that is solely 
remastered without being remixed.175 This is particularly true of remas-
tered works that are part of the loudness wars.176 These works are not 
mere reproductions of the original work in another medium, which 
would generally lack sufficient creativity to warrant a derivative copy-
right.177 Instead, they contain some level of originality and are debat-
ably distinguishable from the underlying work.178 This level of original-
ity is likely less than that of remixed works, which the Compendium finds 
are typically original enough to warrant copyright protection.179 But 
the question remains whether remastering contributes sufficient origi-
                                                                                                                      
171 See e.g., Justice for Audio, http://www.justiceforaudio.org/ (last visited Nov. 7, 
201 Nov. 7, 2012). 
t to the adaptation of a public domain em-
bro
tating that the mastering process is the last creative 
step
4, § 496.03(b)(1). 
2); Turn Me Up, http://turnmeup.org/ (last visited 
172 See supra notes 147–171 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text. 
174 See infra notes 175–366 and accompanying text. 
175 See infra notes 176–261 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra notes 147–171 and accompanying text. 
177 See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (de-
nying derivative copyright to a plastic “Uncle Sam” bank copied from a cast iron version in 
the public domain); Hengst v. Early & Daniel Co., 59 F. Supp. 8, 9–10 (S.D. Ohio 1945) 
(denying copyright to hog gestation tables that merely changed the arrangement of data 
from vertical to horizontal). But see Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443, 445 
(2d Cir. 1960) (granting derivative copyrigh
idery design to a print fabric design). 
178 See Katz, supra note 136, at 12 (s
 of the audio production process). 
179 See id.; Compendium II, supra note 12
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n y to warrant copyright protection under the derivate works excep-
tion.
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framework is needed to address whether a remastered sound recording 
is sufficiently creative to w  status.185 
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180 
 This Part examines the existing analogous case law related to the 
question of originality in derivative musical works.181 Section A estab-
lishes a model articulation of the standard of originality in derivative 
works.182 Section B explores cases that feature derivative musical works 
based on preexisting musical works.183 Finally, Section C examines non-
music cases where courts found valid derivative works within the same 
medium as the original.184 This Part concludes that although these cas-
es are helpful, they are not determinative, and thus a 
arrant derivative work
A. Finding a Standard 
 Not every variation to a sound recording will result in a copyright-
able derivative work, so courts must determine how much originality is 
necessary in the derivative work for it to qualify for copyright; this is a 
determination courts have struggled with.186 Generally, courts fall in 
line with the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of the “sweat of the brow” 
theory of copyright, which would grant copyright protection to works 
where the author merely expends significant effort making the finished 
product.187 For example, copyright was denied to an author
40,000 changes to a book, consisting mostly of the punctuation correc-
tions, spelling changes, and other typographical changes.188 
 
ht protection . . . . Nor is there any doubt that the same was 
true
 Circuit has rejected this holding. See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F. 3d 580, 583 (7th 
Cir.
180 See Gould, supra note 15, at 131–33. 
181 See infra notes 186–263 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 186–199 and accompanying text. 
183 See infra notes 200–241 and accompanying text. 
184 See infra notes 242–263 and accompanying text. 
185 See infra notes 262–263 and accompanying text. 
186 See infra notes 187–195 and accompanying text. 
187 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1991) (“[T]he 
1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt that originality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ 
is the touchstone of copyrig
 under the 1909 Act.”). 
188 Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publ’n, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603, 605–06 (C.D. Cal. 
1967). Seemingly contrary to this principle, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has held that removing reproductions of artwork from a compilation and 
mounting those reproductions onto ceramic tile amounted to a derivative work. Mirage 
Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989). It should be noted, however, that the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh
 1997). 
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 Originality, and not effort, as the Supreme Court stated in 1991 in 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., is essential for copy-
right protection.189 For a work to be original, it must be independently 
created and possess a minimal degree of creativity.190 Thus a derivative 
work, like any work, need show only a modicum of creativity to receive 
copyright protection.191 Courts, however, have struggled to apply this 
modicum of creativity standard to derivative works, leading to much 
litigation.192 One scholar has highlighted the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit’s own inconsistent standards on this question, as it 
has stated that the originality requirement is essentially the same for all 
works but has later cited cases requiring “substantial variation” and a 
“sufficiently gross” difference for derivative works.193 Similarly, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has articulated a more strin-
gent standard for derivative works, requiring substantial variation.194 
More recently, however, it appears to have moved away from this more 
rin
                                                                                                                     
st gent standard, ruling that the standard of originality for derivative 
works is no more demanding than the originality requirement for other 
works.195 
 Professor David Nimmer has adapted the modicum of creativity 
standard into a workable originality standard for derivative works: “[I]n 
order to qualify for a separate copyright as a derivative . . . work, the 
additional matter injected in a prior work, or the manner of rearrang-
ing or otherwise transforming a prior work, must constitute more than 
 
. at 345. 
right 
Act 
Art le decision), where the 
Sec
99 U.S. at 345). The quoted language, the court stated, clarified that a stringent 
stan as inappropriate. See id. at 1290 & 
n.12
189 499 U.S
190 Id. 
191 See id. 
192 See Eric C. Surette, Annotation, What Constitutes Derivative Work Under the Copy
of 1976, 149 A.L.R. Fed. 527 (1998) (“Although § 101 provides a definition of ‘deriva-
tive work’ the issue as to what constitutes a derivative work has often been litigated.”). 
193 2 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 3:53 (2012) (comparing Matthew 
Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998), where the Second Circuit 
stated that the originality requirement is essentially the same for all works, with Medallic 
Co. v. Wash. Mint, 208 F.3d 203 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished tab
ond Circuit cited a case requiring a sufficiently gross requirement for derivative works). 
194 Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983). 
195 Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc. 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2009). In addition, 
with regard to derivative works, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held 
that “all that must be shown is that the work ‘possesses at least some minimal degree of 
creativity. . . . To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice.’” Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Feist, 4
dard, similar to the Seventh Circuit’s standard, w
. 
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a minimal contribution.”196 Professor Nimmer explains that the neces-
sary quantum of originality is any variation that meaningfully distin-
guishes the derivative work from the prior work.197 Numerous courts 
have adopted Professor Nimmer’s standard.198 Although this articu-
lated standard is useful, it is helpful also to examine cases that are 
analogous to music r rts have applied this 
and
 determine what differences in 
musical works will satisfy the originality test.202 Also helpful are the rare 
s applied the derivative work originality stan-
piano-vocal arrangement added harmonies and other elements, creat-
ing a commercially viable derivative work.207 The Second Circuit up-
                                                                                                                     
emastering to see how cou
st ard to similar facts.199 
B. Derivative Musical Works 
 One analogous set of cases in which courts have applied the de-
rivative work originality standard is that of cases involving derivative 
musical compositions.200 These comparisons are imperfect, however, as 
sound recording copyrights are separate from the copyright in the un-
derlying musical composition.201 Yet the reasoning in these cases, pro-
vides some guidance as to how courts
cases in which a court ha
dard to derivative sound recordings.203 
1. Musical Compositions 
 In 1995, in Woods v. Bourne Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit addressed a derivative musical work in resolving a copy-
right termination dispute.204 There, the Second Circuit compared a 
“lead sheet” of a work to a piano-vocal arrangement.205 A lead sheet is a 
handwritten rendering of the lyrics and melody of the work without 
harmonies or other embellishments.206 The defendant claimed that the 
 
196 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 105, § 3.03[A]. 
, 
13 F ooper v. James, 213 F. 871, 873 (N.D. Ga. 1914). 
241 and accompanying text. 
at 981. 
t 989. 
207 Id. 
197 Id. § 3.03[A], at 3–10. 
198 See supra note 116 (collecting cases). 
199 See infra notes 200–261 and accompanying text. 
200 See Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 981 (2d Cir. 1995); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 
v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co.
. Supp. 415, 418 (D. Mass. 1936); C
201 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
202 See infra notes 204–219 and accompanying text. 
203 See infra notes 220–
204 See 60 F.3d 
205 Id. at 992. 
206 Id. a
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held the lower court’s decision that the changes were not substantial 
enough to warrant a derivative copyright.208 Rather, the changes were 
ivia
in the tune or 
e old, with minor changes which any skilled musician might 
ak
                                                                                                                     
tr l and dictated by conventional rules of harmony.209 
 Similarly, a series of older cases reject derivative copyrights in mu-
sical compositions comprised of minimal changes from the original.210 
One notable case is the 1947 decision of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel 
Music Co.211 In Shapiro, the court refused to grant a derivative copyright 
to a piece of music that changed the rhythm and name of a preexisting 
song and added a slight variation in the base of the accompaniment.212 
The court stated that such a copyright would be valid only if the deriva-
tive work was a “new work,” and that without a change 
lyrics of the song, this requirement could not be met.213 
 Other courts have reached similar results.214 In a 1936 decision, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held in Norden 
v. Oliver Ditson Co. that occasional rhythmic changes in the musical 
composition were insufficient to warrant a derivative copyright.215 The 
court reasoned that the changes were too simple to warrant copyright 
protection, stating that “a composition, to be the subject of a copyright, 
must have sufficient originality to make it a new work rather than a 
copy of th
m e.”216 
 Although these cases demonstrate courts’ hesitancy to grant de-
rivative copyrights to slightly altered musical works, they are not deter-
 
208 Id. at 992. 
209 Id. The Second Circuit’s articulation of the originality requirement may reasonably 
confound lower courts. See id. at 990. At least one scholar has noted that the Second Cir-
cuit has issued wildly different standards regarding originality in derivative works. Patry, 
supra note 193, § 3:53. The court in Bourne cited approvingly the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, requiring substantial variation in derivative works. Bourne, 69 
F.3d at 990 (citing Gracen, 698 F.2d 300); Patry, supra note 193, § 3:53. That decision, 
however, has since been questioned by the Seventh Circuit itself. See Noga, 168 F.3d at 1290 
& n.12. Additionally, the Second Circuit has since held that the originality requirement is 
“essentially the same for all works,” including derivative works. Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d at 
680. Thus, although Bourne has not been expressly overruled by the Second Circuit, it is 
unlikely that its holding extends beyond its facts. See id.; Bourne, 69 F.3d at 990. 
210 Shapiro, 73 F. Supp. at 167; Norden, 13 F. Supp. at 418; Cooper, 213 F. at 873. 
211 73 F. Supp. at 167. 
212 Id. 
213 See id. 
214 See Norden, 13 F. Supp. at 418; Cooper, 213 F. at 873. 
215 13 F. Supp. at 418. 
216 Id.; see also Cooper, 213 F. at 873 (holding that the addition of alto parts to a previ-
ously published songbook was not sufficient to create a derivative work). 
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minative, as each concerned a derivative musical composition and not a 
derivative sound recording.217 Conceivably, one could make changes to 
a work that make it sound sufficiently different from the previous 
sound recording but do little to alter the underlying musical composi-
tion.218 For example, if a sound engineer stereoized a monaural re-
cording, she may do little to the musical composition, but her work 
would greatly change the sound recording.219 
. So
ered to utilize fully the sonic potential 
 th
stereoized, and upgraded the sound quality of a public domain movie 
                                                                                                                     
2 und Recordings 
 Perhaps in recognition of the differences in sound quality between 
an original recording and a re-engineered version, some record com-
panies have filed for and received a copyright for re-engineered al-
bums.220 Sire Record Company claimed a separate copyright in a 
CD/DVD release of the “deluxe edition” of the 1986 album Black Cele-
bration by Depeche Mode.221 As the basis for its separate copyright, Sire 
claimed “remixed and remastered versions of all sound recordings 
listed . . . [that were] remixed from original source for new fixation.”222 
Omega Record Group filed a similar claim for a version of a Christmas 
album, claiming new matter as the basis of copyright because the sound 
recording was “remixed & remast
of e compact disc medium.”223 
 Although copyright in re-engineered sound recordings has not 
been fully litigated, one federal district court upheld a copyright in 
such a recording from a public domain work.224 In Maljack Productions, 
Inc. v. UAV Corp., decided in 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California held that the defendant added copyrightable 
elements to a film soundtrack after the defendant digitized, remixed, 
 
217 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); supra notes 204–216 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra notes 133–171 and accompanying text. 
219 See Maljack Prods., Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1416, 1428 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d 
sub nom. Batjac Prods. Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
220 See infra notes 221–223 and accompanying text. 
221 See Copyright Registration No. SR0000616038 (registered Sept. 9, 2007), available at 
http://cocatalog.loc.gov (enter “SR0000616038” in “Search for” field, and select “Registra-
tion Number” in “Search by” field). 
222 Id. 
223 See Copyright Registration No. SR0000145434 (registered July 20, 1992), available at 
http://cocatalog.loc.gov (enter “SR0000145434” in “Search for” field, and select “Registra-
tion Number” in “Search by” field). 
224 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1428. 
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soundtrack.225 The plaintiff Batjac’s copyright claim involved two works 
to which it added copyrightable elements.226 Batjac created a “panned 
and scanned” version of a public domain motion picture for videocas-
settes and edited the picture’s public domain monaural soundtrack by 
remixing, resequencing, sweetening, equalizing, balancing, and stereo-
izing it, and also adding entirely new sound material.227 The defendant 
claimed that Batjac did not have a valid derivative copyright in the new 
soundtrack.228 
 The court, in upholding the copyright, found that the process of 
re-engineering the soundtrack required a “creative mixing and balanc-
ing of sounds” and that the defendant’s version of the soundtrack was a 
“noticeable improvement” over the previous version.229 The court was 
persuaded by both the Copyright Office’s stated standards for copyright 
protection and its own impression of the differences between the two 
soundtracks.230 The court cited 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), but it first looked to 
the Compendium.231 The court was swayed by the fact that the Compen-
dium accepts alterations, such as remixing and stereoizing, as suffi-
ciently original to constitute a derivative work.232 In addition, the court 
rejected the testimony of the defendant’s expert witness, who opined 
that the two different soundtracks were audibly indistinguishable.233 
The court listened to both and found the 1993 version to be a “notice-
able improvement.”234 
 Although the soundtrack in Maljack was re-engineered much like a 
remastered album, the court’s reasoning may not control in litigation 
over remastered albums.235 Notably, the soundtrack in Maljack was re-
mixed in addition to being otherwise re-engineered.236 A remixed al-
                                                                                                                      
225 Id. By remixing and stereoizing the sound recording, the sound engineer likely did 
more to alter the recording than one would typically do in remastering a recording. See 
supra notes 133–146 and accompanying text (examining the differences between mixing, 
mastering, remixing, and remastering a sound recording). 
226 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1426–28. 
227 Id. at 1418. 
228 Id. at 1428. 
229 Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not consider this issue. See Batjac, 160 F.3d 
1223. It should be noted, however, that because the defendant, UAV Corp., already had a 
registered copyright in its remixed and remastered version of the album, the court applied 
a presumption of validity. Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1428; see 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006). 
230 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1428. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. (citing Compendium II, supra note 124, § 496.03(b)(1)). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 See infra notes 236–241 and accompanying text. 
236 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1428. 
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bum can sound noticeably different from the original, as the mixing 
engineer can adjust the particular levels for the various tracks of the 
recording.237 Perhaps recognizing the amount of creativity required by 
this practice, the Compendium notes that remixing is sufficient for copy-
right protection.238 
 Moreover, the engineer in Maljack stereoized the monaural sound-
track.239 Record labels generally stopped releasing monaural records in 
the late 1960s.240 Because termination rights apply only to works cre-
ated on or after January 1, 1978, it is highly unlikely that a remastered 
version of these post-1978 works would be stereoized, because all of the 
works likely will have been originally recorded in stereo sound.241 
C. Non-Musical Derivative Works 
 Non-music cases involving derivative works in the same medium as 
the original also show how courts may apply the originality requirement 
to remastered sound recordings.242 These cases can help determine 
how substantial the differences between the two works must be for the 
derivative work to be deemed original.243 
 In 1983, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in 
Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc. that a sped-up ver-
sion of a video game was a derivative work.244 The court’s conclusion 
implies that the existence of demand for a remastered sound recording 
separate from demand for the original sound recording is important in 
answering whether remastered sound recordings are derivative works.245 
The defendants in Midway sold circuit boards for use inside video game 
machines including one, created under the plaintiff’s license, that sped 
up the rate of play—that is, how fast the sounds and images changed— 
of the plaintiff’s video game “Galaxian.”246 The court acknowledged 
that a sped-up version of a record is likely not a derivative work, but it 
distinguished that from a sped-up video game because of the separate 
                                                                                                                      
237 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
238 See Compendium II, supra note 124, § 493.03(b)(1). 
239 Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1428. 
240 Stereophonic Sound, IEEE Global Hist. Network, http://www.ieeeghn.org/wiki/ 
index.php/Stereophonic_Sound (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
241 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006); Stereophonic Sound, supra note 240. 
242 See infra notes 244–261 and accompanying text. 
243 See infra notes 244–261 and accompanying text. 
244 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1983). 
245 See id. at 1013–14. 
246 See id. at 1010–11. 
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demand for the sped-up game.247 The court went on to say that a sped-
up video game is a “substantially different” work than the original game, 
one that required “some creative effort to produce.”248 
 Maljack, discussed earlier, is also helpful in this regard for its hold-
ing regarding the plaintiff’s derivative copyright of a “pan-and-scan” 
version of a movie.249 A pan-and-scan version of a movie is a more nar-
rowly formatted version that better fits on a standard television 
screen.250 In Maljack, after the movie was reformatted, the ensuing de-
rivative work used only fifty-six percent of each frame compared to the 
original picture.251 The court first established that the panning-and-
scanning process is capable of creating a copyrightable derivative work, 
rejecting the defendants’ argument that the process was merely me-
chanical and thus lacked necessary creativity.252 Then, in determining 
whether the plaintiff’s specific panned-and-scanned work was a deriva-
tive work, the court did not credit two editing expert declarations, 
which stated that the two works were visually indistinguishable.253 In-
stead, the court credited the creator’s statement, in which he attested 
to making his cutting selections to enhance the storytelling, characters, 
and interplay of characters.254 The judge also compared the two works 
and found sufficient changes.255 The court then ruled that the plain-
tiff’s panned-and-scanned work was itself copyrightable as a derivative 
work.256 
                                                                                                                      
247 See id. at 1013–14. The court concluded that “not many people want to hear 33 
RPM records played at 45 and 78 RPM’s so that record licensors would not care if their 
licensees play them at that speed.” Id. at 1013. On the other hand, the court observed that 
there is a big demand for [sped-up] video games. Speeding up a video game’s 
action makes the game more challenging and exciting and increases the li-
censee’s revenue per game. . . . [I]f players are willing to pay an additional 
price-per-minute in exchange for the challenge and excitement of a faster 
game, licensees will take in greater total revenues. 
Id. 
248 Id. at 1013–14. 
249 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1426–28. 
250 Id. at 1418. The theatre version had an aspect ratio (the ratio of screen length to 
screen height) of 2.35-to-1; the plaintiff in Maljack reduced that ratio to 1.33-to-1 for the 
television version. Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 1426–27. 
253 Id. at 1427. 
254 Id. at 1427–28. 
255 Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1428. 
256 Id. 
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 Although both cases provide useful analogies, they do not explic-
itly answer the question at hand.257 Of foremost importance, both 
analyses do not involve sound recordings.258 Additionally, in Maljack, 
because the Copyright Office granted the plaintiff a copyright in the 
pan-and-scan version of the film, the court applied a presumption of 
validity.259 A fair reading of Maljack, then, shows only that the defen-
dants failed to overcome this presumption of validity.260 Although re-
cord labels are beginning to seek and receive copyrights for remastered 
works, it is not clear that all such remastered works will be separately 
copyrighted when litigation over the termination of sound recordings 
begins.261 These cases provide some guidance, but they are not deter-
minative.262 A unique legal analysis that distinguishes between remas-
tered sound recordings and other derivative works is thus required.263 
III. Remastered Albums Are Derivative Works 
 Remastered sound recordings present a difficult case for the pre-
existing derivative work originality framework.264 Commentators have 
examined the issue but have failed to reach a consensus.265 It is not pos-
sible to provide a definitive answer covering all possible remastered 
sound recordings and their status as derivative works considering the 
spectrum of creativity and originality possible in all works regarded as 
“remastered.”266 Taking into account the effect of the loudness wars on 
the mastering of music and its sound, however, it is plausible that many 
remastered sound recordings have a noticeably different sound from 
the original recordings.267 Drawing to some extent on the existing 
framework outlined in Part II, this Part argues that, as a general rule, 
                                                                                                                      
257 See infra notes 258–261 and accompanying text. 
258 See Midway, 704 F.2d at 1013; Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1426–28. 
259 Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1426; see 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006). This presumption of va-
lidity puts the burden on the party challenging the copyright to prove the copyrighted 
work does not meet the appropriate originality standard. 3 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 
105, § 12.11[B][1][a]. 
260 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c); Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1426. 
261 See supra notes 220–223 and accompanying text; see also Copyright Catalog U.S. Copy-
right Off., http://cocatalog.loc.gov (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (enter “remaster” in “Search 
for” field, and select “Keyword” in “Search by” field) (listing only 179 entries for copyrights 
sought for remastered recordings). 
262 See supra notes 200–261 and accompanying text. 
263 See infra notes 264–366 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra notes 175–261 and accompanying text. 
265 See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 225–26; Gould, supra note 15, at 131–33. 
266 See supra notes 133–146 and accompanying text. 
267 See supra notes 147–174 and accompanying text. 
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remastered works, particularly those that were affected by the loudness 
wars, meet the standard of originality and thus qualify as derivative 
works.268 Accordingly, record companies should be able to continue to 
exploit these remastered recordings post-termination.269 
A. Remastered Sound Recordings Fit Within the Existing Legal Standard 
 Remastered albums fit into the standard articulated by judges and 
commentators of a copyrightable derivative work.270 Although courts 
occasionally ask for substantial differences between the derivative work 
and the original, the generally accepted standard is merely that some-
thing more than a minimal contribution is required to create a deriva-
tive work.271 This contribution need only distinguish the derivative 
work from the prior work in a meaningful manner.272 As one scholar 
has noted, this source of originality in a sound recording can emanate 
from not just the artist, but also the producer, who processes, compiles, 
and edits the sound.273 A remastered sound recording generally distin-
guishes the derivative work from the prior work in a meaningful man-
ner, particularly if it was mastered according to the so-called “loudness 
wars” rationale.274 
 As the reactions to the loudness wars demonstrate, there is a no-
ticeable difference between original recordings and their remastered 
counterparts.275 Artists, such as Duran Duran guitarist Andy Taylor, 
have claimed a marked difference between their original sound re-
cordings and the remastered ones.276 Music reviewers have referred to 
some remastered recordings as “much better” than the original re-
cordings.277 Similarly, consumers can detect meaningful differences, 
and many have called for the remastering of certain recordings.278 For 
example, over 22,000 fans of the band Metallica have signed an online 
petition to have the album Death Magnetic remastered because of their 
                                                                                                                      
268 See infra notes 270–366 and accompanying text. 
269 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2006). 
270 See infra notes 271–320 and accompanying text. 
271 See supra notes 186–199 and accompanying text. 
272 See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 64–65 
(1st Cir. 2010); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 105, § 3.03[A]. 
273 Marshall A. Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law 138 (5th ed. 2010). 
274 See infra notes 275–320 and accompanying text. 
275 See supra notes 147–174 and accompanying text. 
276 Michaels, supra note 165. 
277 The Thirty Best Reissues Ever, supra note 166. 
278 See Petition to Re-Mix or Remaster Death Magnetic!, supra note 168. 
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disappointment with the original sound recording.279 When sonic en-
gineers remaster recordings to change the product, consumers and art-
ists notice.280 
 Remastered sound recordings also fit comfortably within the defi-
nition of derivative works found in the case law.281 A persuasive analogy 
can be drawn between remastered sound recordings and the pan-and-
scan movie from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia’s opinion in Maljack Productions, Inc. v. UAV Corp.282 Despite the 
fact that the story of the movie did not change, and that no new foot-
age was added in the derivative pan-and-scan movie, the court in Mal-
jack nonetheless found that the process of editing the film to meet a 
new aspect ratio was sufficiently creative to warrant derivative copyright 
protection.283 Similarly, one could argue that a remastered version of a 
sound recording warrants derivative copyright protection, even though 
it does not change the underlying melody or lyrics of a sound re-
cording.284 The lack of such changes is not significant to copyright 
law.285 The sound engineer, much like the editor of the pan-and-scan 
movie, makes artistic decisions; for example, how to best reach the 
sonic potential of a song through balancing, equalizing, and enhancing 
certain aspects.286 
 To be sure, the analogy is not perfect.287 The producer of the pan-
and-scan movie deleted forty-four percent of the film.288 By contrast, a 
remastering engineer changes only what already exists without deleting 
any preexisting material.289 It does not appear, however, that copyright 
law takes note of such a distinction.290 For example, in Midway Manu-
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280 See supra notes 160–171 and accompanying text. 
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facturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit found that a sped-up version of the “Galaxian” video 
game was a derivative work, despite the fact that the creator merely 
sped up what already existed without deleting anything from the 
game.291 The two works were so similar that the district court found 
that of approximately 10,000 bytes (i.e., computer words of source 
code) in the two works, only approximately 488 were different, mean-
ing that just less than five percent of the code for the derivative game 
differed from the original.292 Regardless, the court concluded that the 
sped-up version of the video game was a derivative work because of its 
value as a separate work to consumers.293 The previously noted con-
sumer demand for remastered sound recordings provides a similar ra-
tionale.294 
 Despite this compelling justification for viewing some remastered 
sound recordings as valid derivative works, artists may argue that a re-
mastered sound recording does not meet the requisite level of creativity 
necessary to receive a copyright.295 This argument is unlikely to hold 
water.296 As the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1991 in Feist Publication, 
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., creativity is a component of original-
ity.297 Professor David Nimmer’s originality standard for derivative 
works encapsulates a test for creativity, requiring more than a minimal 
contribution that renders the work meaningfully distinguishable from 
the original work.298 If remastered works satisfy this test, which this 
Note argues they do, then they are sufficiently creative to warrant copy-
right protection.299 Additionally, in Feist the Supreme Court  held that 
the level of creativity required for copyright protection is quite low—
the vast majority of works meet the standard quite easily, no matter how 
“crude, humble or obvious” the creativity may seem.300 As such, the act 
                                                                                                                      
291 Midway, 704 F.2d at 1010–13. 
292 See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d, 
704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983). 
293 Midway, 704 F.2d at 1013–14. 
294 See supra notes 167–171 and accompanying text. 
295 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that 
creativity is a requirement for copyright protection). 
296 See infra notes 297–301 and accompanying text. 
297 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
298 See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 105, § 3.03[A]. 
299 See id.; supra notes 270–294 and accompanying text. 
300 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
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of choosing which parts of a song to accentuate and alter through the 
remastering process almost certainly meets this standard.301 
                                                                                                                     
 Furthermore, a policy argument against this result—that it will be 
too easy for record labels to mass-produce derivative works in order to 
avoid termination—can be resolved by reference to Maljack’s treatment 
of the pan-and-scan movie.302 There, the court stated that panning-and-
scanning had the “potential” to create a derivative work, implying that 
panned-and-scanned versions of motion pictures are not given per se 
derivative work treatment.303 The court went on to rule that this par-
ticular panned-and-scanned movie was copyrightable, citing the decla-
ration of its creator, who claimed to make artistic decisions about the 
composition of each frame.304 For example, if two characters in a mo-
tion picture have a conversation at a distance too wide to keep both 
from fitting within the television’s dimensions, the editor must make a 
creative decision whether to focus on just one character during the 
conversation or to pan between the two.305 It seems unlikely that a 
computer program that automatically cut off the outer forty-four per-
cent of the frame, or a creator doing the same, would contribute 
enough creativity to warrant a copyright.306 
 Similarly, attempts to produce remastered albums cheaply by up-
ping the average volume would also likely lack sufficient creativity.307 
Instead, the record label would have to show that creative decisions 
were made regarding which parts of the sound recordings to edit soni-
 
301 See supra notes 136–140, 143–146 and accompanying text (examining the process of 
mastering and remastering a recording); see also CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1260 
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a publisher’s price listings for collectible coins was creative 
and thus copyrightable); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that a form compiling statistics on baseball pitchers was creative and thus copyright-
able); cf. Margit Livingston, Inspiration or Imitation: Copyright Protection for Stage Directions, 50 
B.C. L. Rev. 427, 442–43 (2009) (arguing that stage directions to a play are sufficiently 
creative to warrant protection as a derivative work). 
302 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1427; Frisch & Fortnow supra note 9, at 225–26 (high-
lighting how easy it could be for record labels to create derivative works cheaply and con-
tinue to exploit valuable recordings); Gould, supra note 15, at 132 (arguing that if simple 
remastering qualifies for the derivative works exception, the entire termination scheme for 
sound recordings would be vitiated). 
303 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1427. 
304 Id. at 1427–28. 
305 3 Alexander Lindey & Michael Landau, Lindey on Entertainment, Publish-
ing and the Arts § 6:14, at 6–33 (3d ed. 2012). 
306 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1427; Lindey & Landau, supra note 305, § 6:14, at 6–33. 
307 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1427; Lindey & Landau, supra note 305, § 6:14, at 6–33. 
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cally to best effect the overall enjoyment of the song or to improve its 
quality.308 
 Furthermore, Maljack’s treatment of the remixed and remastered 
soundtrack provides better guidance for courts handling remastered 
sound recordings than the cases rejecting derivative copyright in al-
tered musical compositions.309 Those cases focus on the composition of 
the work and not the sound recording.310 Therefore, these courts ar-
ticulate rules that do not withstand scrutiny when applied to sound re-
cordings.311 For example, in 1947, in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vo-
gel Music Co., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York stated that without a change in the tune or lyrics of a song, there 
could not be a new work.312 This may be true regarding a musical com-
position, but it is clearly not true for a sound recording.313 The 1976 
Act itself urges against extending such a standard to sound recordings, 
explicitly recognizing that a “derivative work in which the actual sounds 
fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise 
altered in sequence or quality” is protectable.314 As previously argued, 
remastering a sound recording certainly has the potential to alter its 
quality, even if it is for the worse.315 
 Maljack thus provides a better model for how a court should de-
cide the issue because the Maljack court addresses sound recordings, 
rather than arrangements.316 Crucially, the court used its own judg-
ment by actually listening to the two different sound recordings and 
rejected expert testimony regarding the two works’ similarities.317 This 
reliance on notable auditory differences may lead to remastered works 
                                                                                                                      
308 See supra notes 304–306 and accompanying text. 
309 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1428; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 
73 F. Supp. 165, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415, 418 (D. 
Mass. 1936); Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871, 873 (N.D. Ga. 1914). 
310 See Shapiro, 73 F. Supp. at 167 (stating that there would only be a valid derivative 
work if the new composition was a new work); Norden, 13 F. Supp. at 418 (same); Cooper, 
213 F. at 873 (same). 
311 See Shapiro, 73 F. Supp. at 167; Norden, 13 F. Supp. at 418; Cooper, 213 F. at 873; infra 
notes 312–315 and accompanying text. 
312 Shapiro, 73 F. Supp. at 167. 
313 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1427 (stating that stereoizing a monaural sound recording 
can meet the level of creativity necessary for a valid derivative work); Compendium II, supra 
note 124, § 496.03(b)(1) (same). Editing a sound recording to make it stereo instead of 
mono does not change the underlying musical composition. See Jaffe, supra note 18, at 146 
(explaining the difference between sound recordings and musical compositions). 
314 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2006). 
315 See supra notes 160–171 and accompanying text. 
316 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1428. 
317 Id. 
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receiving derivative copyright protection, as artists, sound technicians, 
and consumers alike claim that there is often a noticeable difference 
between the original sound recording and its remastered version.318 
The Maljack court’s distrust of expert testimony, however, could disad-
vantage litigants seeking to receive a derivative copyright in remastered 
works.319 Although an expert would likely testify to technical sonic dif-
ferences in a remastered sound recording, a judge with an undiscern-
ing ear could disregard that testimony if she does not hear a significant 
difference between the two recordings herself.320 
                                                                                                                     
B. The Economic Implications of Remastered Albums Surviving Termination 
 Artists may argue that even if remastered works are derivative 
works, such a result does not effectuate the purpose of the termination 
provision of the 1976 Act, and thus that a court should avoid a finding 
that undermines legislative intent.321 As the remainder of this Note ex-
plains, however, such a finding not only effectuates the purpose of the 
termination provision, but also furthers the purpose of the derivative 
works exception to termination.322 To understand why, some economic 
analysis is necessary.323 
 If remastered sound recordings are found to be derivative works, 
the recording artist could still terminate the grant to the original re-
cordings, and the record label could keep the remastered version of 
the songs.324 The record company can continue to utilize those remas-
tered versions, and the recording artist is free to seek a new contract 
with the original recordings in hand.325 Thus, as a result of termina-
 
 
318 See supra notes 160–171 and accompanying text. 
319 See Maljack, 964 F. Supp. at 1428. 
320 See id. It should be noted, however, that the expert testimony disregarded by the 
court in Maljack claimed that a stereoized version of a previously monaural sound re-
cording was not in fact in stereo. Id. This testimony was so easily refuted by listening to the 
recordings in question that the court may have discredited the totality of the expert’s tes-
timony and not actually weighed its subjective opinion over that of a credible expert. See id. 
321 See Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571–72 (1966) (“Departure from a literal reading 
of statutory language may, on occasion, be indicated by relevant internal evidence of the 
statute itself and necessary in order to effect the legislative purpose.”). 
322 See infra notes 324–366 and accompanying text; see also Register’s Report, supra 
note 67, at 53. (“The primary purpose of this provision was to protect the author and his 
family against his unprofitable or improvident disposition of the copyright.”); supra notes 
108–111 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of the derivative works exception 
to the termination provision). 
323 See infra notes 324–350 and accompanying text. 
324 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2006). 
325 See id. The statute regarding termination rights is not explicit, as it could be argued 
that “utilize” in the context of the statute would not allow a record company to make addi-
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tion, both the record label and the artist will have copyrights in sepa-
rate sound recordings of the same underlying song.326 Although the 
two sound recordings may be technically different in the eyes of copy-
right law (much like the two versions of the movie in Maljack), for many 
they will be substitute goods.327 
                                                                                                                     
 These separate copyrights are bad, economically, for both the re-
cord company and the recording artist.328 Copyright normally grants 
an artificial monopoly to its holder, allowing the copyright holder to 
charge a higher price than would prevail under normal market condi-
tions.329 This monopoly no longer exists if most consumers view the two 
versions of the song as substitute goods.330 Simple economic theory 
posits that if there is competition in the marketplace, prices will even-
tually fall to the marginal cost—the cost of producing and distributing 
one additional copy.331 For an already produced sound recording, 
where the cost of production is extremely low, the marginal cost is also 
quite low.332 
 One could argue that, with just two competing sellers, there is not 
perfect competition.333 Instead, it is an oligopoly: a market structure 
featuring few producers who can influence price by their decisions re-
garding how much to produce, but who cannot unilaterally dictate 
 
tional copies of its derivative work. See 3 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 105, § 11.02[C][1]. 
It is the opinion of Professor Nimmer, however, that a fair reading of the statute would 
allow the grant holder to make more copies of the derivative work; otherwise it would be 
difficult to truly utilize the work in any practical sense. See id. 
326 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1); Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 226. 
327 See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 226. If, for example, a movie producer wants 
to use a particular song in his movie, both versions of that song, the original and the re-
mastered version, may suit his purpose. See supra notes 284–286 and accompanying text 
(noting that a remastered version of a song will have the same lyrics and melody as the 
original work). 
328 See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 226; Nimmer & Menell, supra note 18, at 415–
16; see also Mark Seidenfeld, Microeconomic Predicates to Law and Economics 39–
42 (1996) (explaining the economic advantages of a monopoly market for the producer). 
329 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The 
monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily de-
signed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an 
important public purpose may be achieved.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326, 328 (1989). 
330 See Seidenfeld, supra note 328, at 12–14 (explaining the effect of product substitu-
tion on a market); Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 226; Nimmer & Menell, supra note 
18, at 415–16. 
331 See Seidenfeld, supra note 328, at 38; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement 
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 995 (1997). 
332 See Landes & Posner, supra note 329, at 328; Lemley, supra note 331, at 995. 
333 See infra notes 334–337 and accompanying text. 
2012] Remastered Albums, Record Companies, & Copyright Termination 1925 
price.334 There is reduced incentive to price-compete in an oligopoly 
because if one seller lowers its price all others will have to do the same 
to compete.335 It is thus advantageous for the group not to compete on 
price to keep prices from falling to marginal cost.336 If the post-
termination market for a sound recording is an oligopolistic market, 
the competitors would not vigorously price-compete, lessening the 
threat to both parties of losing the ability to monopoly price.337 
 For multiple reasons, however, this does not affect the preceding 
economic analysis.338 For instance, it is not clear that a market of mul-
tiple sound recordings would fit a traditional economic definition of an 
oligopoly.339 Copyrighted works are public goods, meaning copies are 
easy to make and essentially unlimited.340 Thus, neither competitor can 
influence price by choosing how much to produce, as the actual quan-
tity of units produced will have little effect on price.341 Additionally, 
even if the market can be classified as an oligopoly, economic theory 
posits that a good’s price in an oligopoly, although greater than mar-
ginal cost, will be less than the same good’s price in a monopoly.342 As 
such, both competitors may find it advantageous to split the profits of 
the higher monopoly price by coming to an agreement rather than 
risking competition.343 
 The result is that, despite keeping possession of part of a recording 
artist’s catalog, the record company’s profitability will decrease.344 Ad-
ditionally, the artist will not receive the full benefit of his or her termi-
nation rights.345 Other record labels will be reluctant to purchase the 
rights to the terminated sound recordings because of potential compe-
tition in the market.346 If the artists decided to exploit their copyrights 
on their own without a record label, they would still suffer because, fac-
ing competition, the artist could sell their work only at its low marginal 
                                                                                                                      
334 Seidenfeld, supra note 328, at 85. 
335 See E. Thomas Sullivan & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Understanding Antitrust and 
Its Economic Implications 23 (5th ed. 2008). 
336 Id. 
337 See id. 
338 See infra notes 339–343 and accompanying text. 
339 See infra notes 340–341 and accompanying text. 
340 See Landes & Posner, supra note 329, at 326. 
341 See id. at 326–27. 
342 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89 
Minn. L. Rev. 9, 17 (2004). 
343 See id. 
344 See Nimmer & Menell, supra note 18, at 415; Piraino, supra note 342, at 17. 
345 Gould, supra note 15, at 132; see 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2006). 
346 Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 226. 
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cost or, alternatively only at the oligopolistic price instead of the mo-
nopoly price.347 
 Facing this economic situation, both parties will likely choose to 
renegotiate with one another to maintain the copyright monopoly.348 
Now, however, the recording artist has the ability, by terminating, to 
reduce the record company’s profits.349 Thus, when the two parties re-
negotiate, the likely result is that the artist will get a higher percentage 
cut of the profits and a more definitive voice in the exploitation of the 
work than he or she had in the original contract.350 
C. Excepting Remastered Albums from Termination as Derivative Works  
Is an Equitable Result 
 This end result, excepting remastered albums from termination as 
derivative works, realizes the underlying goal of the termination provi-
sion of the 1976 Act.351 It allows recording artists to receive more fortui-
tous contracts once the true value of their work is better known.352 
When artists first sign with a record label, they usually receive some-
where between nine percent and thirteen percent in royalties.353 
Meanwhile, artists whose albums sell more than 750,000 copies gener-
ally earn between eighteen percent and twenty percent in royalties.354 
In addition, sound recordings can fetch prices from as low as $5000 to 
as high as $25,000 if they are used in motion pictures.355 Artists will be 
paid only half of this amount under normal recording contracts.356 
                                                                                                                      
347 See supra notes 328–343 and accompanying text. At least one major artist is plan-
ning on establishing a website to distribute its recordings on its own, digitally. See Van 
Buskirk, supra note 119 (“Just think of what the Eagles are doing when they get back their 
whole catalog. They don’t need a record company now. . . . You’ll be able to go to Eagles-
band.com . . . and get all their songs.”). 
348 See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 9, at 226; Nimmer & Menell, supra note 18, at 415–
16. This decision may raise antitrust concerns, which is beyond the scope of this Note. See 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (proscribing contracts and combinations in restraint of trade); id. § 2 
(proscribing monopolization, attempted monopolization, conspiracy to monopolize, and 
related attempts). 
349 See Nimmer & Menell, supra note 18, at 415–16. 
350 See id. 
351 See Abrams, supra note 47, at 209–11; Nimmer & Menell, supra note 18, at 416; infra 
notes 352–366 and accompanying text. 
352 See Nimmer & Menell, supra note 18, at 416. 
353 Donald S. Passman, All You Need to Know About the Music Business: Re-
vised and Updated for the 21st Century 109 (4th ed. 2000). 
354 Id. at 108–09. 
355 Id. at 242, 424. 
356 Donald E. Biederman et al., Law and Business of the Entertainment Indus-
tries 723 (5th ed. 2007); Passman, supra note 353, at 426. 
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Thus, artists possessing the ability independently to distribute their 
work post-termination, will likely demand higher royalty rates.357 Re-
cord labels, which have high costs and rely on valuable artists to drive 
revenue, will likely concede some percentage of profits to maintain 
their ability to monopoly price.358 
 At the same time, by essentially forcing negotiations with the origi-
nal record label, this solution equitably allows recording companies to 
retain value after their investment in the artist and their catalogue.359 
When a record label signs a new artist, it takes a substantial risk.360 The 
record label often advances a large, up-front sum to the artist and usu-
ally agrees to subsidize music-video production; a promotional tour; 
and all promotional, manufacturing, and distribution costs.361 If the 
artist never achieves commercial success, the label does not require the 
artist to repay the investment, and thereby assumes the risk of financial 
loss.362 Indeed, more often than not, labels take that loss, as few signed 
artists ever become commercially successful.363 Therefore, record labels 
share the same concern about termination that motion picture pro-
ducers do: they need to recoup costly up-front investment.364 Congress 
seemingly found this argument persuasive when it carved out excep-
tions to the termination right.365 This result thus also furthers the pur-
pose of the derivative works exception by promoting investment in risky 
artistic ventures.366 
Conclusion 
 Record labels are scared of the terminator, and with good reason. 
When artists begin to terminate, litigation will likely be intense as re-
cording companies desperately try to hold onto the rights of valuable 
sound recordings. Luckily for the record companies, there are two ma-
                                                                                                                      
357 See Nimmer & Menell, supra note 18, at 415–16. 
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jor carve-outs to termination rights included in the Copyright Act of 
1976: the work-made-for-hire exception and the derivative works excep-
tion. Although record companies will surely argue that the valuable al-
bums in their vaults are works made for hire, and thus nonterminable, 
they will likely also argue that all remastered sound recordings made by 
the label are derivative works that do not revert back to the original art-
ist. Considering the applicable law, this claim has a relatively strong like-
lihood of success for the record labels, especially in light of the “loud-
ness wars” and its effect on the sound of remastered albums. But 
recording artists need not despair, as they will likely still enter into post-
termination contracts that are more valuable than their pre-
termination counterparts. In that way, the intent behind both the ter-
mination provision and the derivative works exception is effectuated. 
James J. Schneider 
